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Rising Wages: Has China Lost Its Global Labor Advantage?
I. Introduction
In the past decade, China's emergence as the workshop of the world and as the largest receiver of foreign direct investment (FDI) has profoundly influenced global trade patterns and the competitive landscape. The impetus for these successes stems in large part from China's comparatively low wages for workers. However, Chinese wages have risen sharply with globalization; average real wages more than tripled in the ten years from 1997 to 2007, according to published government data. Since soaring wages may eventually erode one of China's most prominent global economic advantages, its low labor costs, this phenomenon has drawn increasing attention from social scientists, policy makers and the public. Two recent studies by Chinese academic institutions sound the alarm on issues concerning China's labor market conditions. The Institute of Population and Labor Economics at the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), in its Green Book on Population and Labor 2007,
predicted that China will reach a "Lewisian turning point," where rural surplus labor is depleted to such a level that continuing industrialization cannot be supported cheaply (Cai, 2007) Anxiety over rising labor costs in China has also spread to international advisory and business communities. Recent reports have warned that China is starting to lose its luster as a 2 manufacturing base for exports.
1 Similar dispatches note that since accelerated wage growth squeezes the margins of multinational corporations (MNCs), the conditions for FDI in China are deteriorating relative to other emerging economies in Asia. 2 Yet, despite the prominence of such narratives, there remains little systematic documentation on the extent and scope of rising wages in China. There is also a dearth of reliable information on how wages in China compare with levels in other emerging and advanced economies.
This paper seeks to fill this gap by documenting systematically the changes in the structure of wages in China for the period 1978-2007 and by comparing China's wage levels with its neighboring Asian economies. Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First, we provide a careful analysis of China's changing wage levels over time across major industries, ownership categories and geographic locations by compiling and adjusting aggregate statistics from many different published sources. We show that, though it is true that real wage has increased seven-fold in the past three decades, the growth has been uneven. Wages of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have increased rapidly in the past decade, currently surpassing the level of the non-public sector, and wage disparities between skill-intensive and labor-intensive 1 An article in BusinessWeek (March 27, 2006) notes that corporations and suppliers are beginning to look for more profitable options, including countries such as Vietnam or Indonesia. The Economist (January 11, 2007) notes that pay for factory workers has been rising at "double-digit rates for several years." The New York Times (August 29, 2007 ) profiles a number of factory managers having difficulty finding workers and dealing with wage rises. 2 Rising labor costs has been one of the important reasons that forced thousands of small and medium manufacturing firms in Guangdong province to cease production, go bankrupt, or relocate to other regions with more desirable operating conditions in the past one to two years. Guangdong accounts for roughly one third of China's total export. The Economist (January 11, 2007) notes spiraling costs mean that firms are searching for better investments elsewhere in Asia, including Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam. The Japanese External Trade
Organization has encouraged companies with a China-Plus-One Strategy to consider strengthening their policy towards the "Plus One" (JETRO, 2006) . 3 industries and between geographic regions in China, which began to appear in the 1990s, have widened considerably.
Secondly, we utilize data sources from the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) to construct internationally comparable time series of manufacturing wages of China and ten neighboring economies and regions in Asia. These two independent statistical sources complement each other by demonstrating consistent trends in cross-country wage comparisons, in ways that have not been attempted previously. Although China's manufacturing wage has grown faster than its neighbors, its wage level is only just beginning to be competitive with other developing countries in the region. China continues to enjoy enormous cost clout advantages over more developed economies, as its wage level is, on average, still only about 7 to 21% of economies such as Japan and Hong Kong.
Thirdly, we analyze the demand and supply conditions for skilled and unskilled labor in China covering the periods before and after the outbreak of the current economic crisis.
Overall, our views are less pessimistic than the studies discussed earlier: wage growth for unskilled labor will be moderate due to the potentially large supply of workers, made up of workers from the rural sector and employees who were laid off as a result of state-sector restructuring. Wage growth for skilled labor will also likely taper off because of the convergence of college wage premiums to international standards in recent years and the anticipated robust supply of university graduates and returned professionals from overseas.
We conclude that China will still maintain its competitive edge in low labor cost in the near future.
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 analyzes wage trends within China, while Liu, 1998; Li 2001; Fleisher et al. 2005; Yang, 2005) , income inequality (e.g. Gustafsson et al. 2008) , and the gender earning gap (e.g., Knight and Song 2003) . Varying with individual projects, informative statistics on changes in wage levels and employment structures are presented for selected years and subgroups of the workforce, but there has been no documentation of broad changes in wage trends and employment structures. The paucity of studies on China's wage trends reflects in part the lack of systematic, consistent aggregate data that cover wages and labor compensation over a wide basis and an extended period of time. 4 Therefore, by definition, staff and workers are employed in cities, and they constitute more than 95% of total employment in formal urban units over the selected years (Holz, 2006) . Presumably they also include rural migrant workers employed in the (a)-(g) types of work units.
Total wages or earnings refer to the total remuneration payment to staff and workers during a period of a year (NBSa, 2008) . They include all types of payments in money or in kind, including salaries paid for fixed time periods and other payments based on piece work, bonuses, allowances, subsidies, overtime pay, and extra pay for working under hazardous and dangerous conditions. Total wages are not equivalent to total labor compensation, a measure often used in international comparisons, which also includes pension contributions and social insurance payments that employers are required to pay to city governments on behalf of their employees or welfare fund payments such as employer contributions to housing funds, which (2000) and Knight and Song (2003) for descriptions of wage systems under planning. (2005) estimated that the unemployment rate of urban permanent residents increased from 6.1% in 1996 to 11.1% in 2002. Using independent population data sources, Knight and Xue (2006) have arrived at similar estimates that China's urban unemployment rate increased gradually from 7.7% in 1995 to 11.5% in 2000. Unemployment was widespread, hitting older workers, women and those with less education particularly hard (Giles et al. 2006) . In later discussions, we will propose our view that these laid off workers constitute an effective segment of the labor supply pool of the unskilled workers, which presents the one possibility for the limiting of further increases in the wages of unskilled labor. 7 The monetarization of non-wage benefits is likely another force that contributed to rising wages in the state sector. Under planning, SOEs provided various non-wage benefits such as housing services, health care, work insurance and even child care for the children of their employees. With state sector restructuring, such benefits have been monetized, converting the implicit or shadow wages to explicit wages. Such processes have coincided with massive layoffs in SOEs, contributing to wage growth in China's public sector (see Ge and Yang, 2009 ).
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C. Wages by Region
Three decades into the era of reform, the once-egalitarian distribution of wages across China's provinces has disappeared, replaced by significant variations in worker compensation that define the regional comparative advantage in labor costs within China itself. Recent literature has shown that regional equality declined in the initial phase of reform between 1978 and 1985, but inter-regional inequality has increased considerably since then (e.g., Yang, 2002; Kanbur and Zhang, 2005; Wan et al., 2007) . A series of government policies and strategies, including urban-specific fiscal and credit programs as well as development strategies tilted towards the growth of coastal regions, especially when combined with restrictions on factor mobility, has contributed to unbalanced regional growth (e.g., Yang, 2002) . Moreover, as Demurger et al. (2002) argues, initial economic conditions, such as advantageous geographic factors and superior endowments in physical and human capital, also helped attract FDI and promoted trade in the coastal regions.
By the end of 1990s, the Chinese government became keenly aware that imbalanced 9 The GINI coefficients reported in Table 1 are notably low relative to GINI coefficients of income estimated using individual or household data, which have grown over the past three decades. One reason is that wages as measured here tend to have less variation than income due to the exclusion of non-labor earnings. Another reason is that aggregate wage inequality measures across provinces and regions do not necessarily reflect wage inequality across individuals within the aggregate units. 
D. Wages by Industry
Similar to wage patterns across regions, there is a clear diverging trend in wage levels across
industries. As Figure 3 shows, wages across industries stay clustered until the early 1990s, but then average wages for skill-intensive industries, such as banking and insurance and scientific research and polytechnic services, rocketed past the wage levels in labor-intensive industries of manufacturing, construction, whole sale and retail services. 14 We emphasize one important finding. Contrary to popular belief that manufacturing wages grew the fastest because of China's rapidly increasing volume of exports, wage growth in this sector has been below the national average. This is despite the fact that manufactured goods accounted for more than 90% of China's exports and attracted approximately 60% of FDI in recent years (NBSa, 2007 (NBSa, , 2008 . In fact, manufacturing wages have moved in lockstep with wages in construction and wholesale and retail services, which are largely non-tradable sectors of the economy. There is strong evidence that competitive labor markets for unskilled workers have developed across these basic production and service industries, so that the wages in these industries have moved jointly. The upward movements in wages have been limited because workers in these industries can be drawn from the large pool of rural, 
III. International Wage Comparisons
Despite its considerable importance, data related to comparable cross country wages are not easily available or usable, largely due to the obstacle of international wage data being subject to a patchwork of definitions and coverage, all typically unique to individual country standards. The ILO October Inquiry labor market statistics for manufacturing are the most widely used data source in international wage studies (ILO, 2009 Beginning with the ILO comparisons, Figure 4A shows that the manufacturing wage in China was well below other selected developing economies in Asia in the 1980s, but because of the strong growth since the late 1990s, the gaps are largely closed. By 2007, 12 The 2005 UNIDO statistics are the latest available data because of its three-year lag data availability policy.
China's manufacturing wages was comparable to the levels of the Philippines and Thailand, although still significantly below that of Malaysia. Figure 4B indicates that even though the manufacturing wage in China has increased at a fast clip over the past three decades, there remains an enormous gap between manufacturing wages in China and those in developed economies. In 2007, China's manufacturing wage was about 7% of Japan, 8-9% of Korea and Singapore, and 18-21% of Taiwan and Hong Kong (see Table 2 ). These results are clear evidence of the fact that China's wages have remained comparatively low and have not priced China out of its global advantages as the world's workshop and FDI magnet.
Our investigations based on the UNIDO statistical source carried out independently from the ILO data series lead to the same conclusion. Although wage levels implied by UNIDO data do not necessarily match with the ILO series, due in part to the differences in data collection methods, Figure 4 reveals that the overall picture remains the same. While fast earnings growth has already propelled manufacturing wages in China above those of Indonesia and India in the late 1990s, it still trails behind that of Malaysia and Thailand, and stays significantly below the levels in Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Japan. Indeed, the large percentage wage rises in China over the past one and half decades are essentially matched in absolute terms by wage rises in developed Asian economies or regions (see Table   2 ).
The wage comparisons presented so far have not taken into account the influence of recent currency appreciation of the Chinese Yuan on labor market competitiveness and the potential consequences of China's explosive growth in foreign exchange reserves. 13 Between 13 We thank the referee for directing our attention to the effect of exchange rate fluctuations on labor market it is difficult to forecast whether China will reduce its control over the exchange rate of Yuan given added pressure for policy shifts stemming from growth in foreign reserves, existing evidence suggests that potential currency appreciation in the next several years is unlikely to alter the major conclusions we have drawn on China's labor market competitiveness.
Therefore, two different data sources with two alternative data measures both underline the fact that the rising wage trend in China, while significant, belies no implication that its advantage as a major supplier of low cost labor will be displaced soon. The next section assesses the reasons driving the different spreads between skilled and unskilled labor, and outlines a framework for assessing the likely development of wage trends in China, determined by fundamental demand and supply forces in the labor market.
IV. Will China Maintain its Labor Cost Advantage?
The wages trends analyzed above have captured the major features of China's evolving wage structures up to 2008, before the world economy plunged into the still deepening financial and economic crisis. Essentially, both cross-country manufacturing wage comparisons and the analysis of domestic labor earnings convey the same message: although there have been wage increases across the board, there is a clear difference between increases in the skilled and those in unskilled sectors. While wages for skilled labor increased sharply, wages for unskilled labor in manufacturing, construction and basic service sectors are still low, 20 compared with both skill intensive sectors in China and wages in other developed Asian economies. This finding partly addresses some of the concern over China potentially losing its competitive edge due to its fast wage growth in recent years. Indeed, it is the sharp increase in the wages of skilled labor and the increasing share of the skilled labor in the total labor force that is the main thrust behind the overall wage rise pattern in China. Below we present some analyses of this wage growth disparity in skilled and unskilled labor, and argue that due to major shifts in demand and supply conditions in the labor market, the pace of rising wages for both skilled and unskilled labor is likely to slow down in the foreseeable future.
Strong demand for labor stemmed from the unprecedented GDP growth of more 10%
per annum, and export growth of nearly 30% per annum since China's WTO accession in 2001 has been the major force pushing up the wage of workers with low skills. However, with exports and GDP growth likely cooling down to more sustainable levels, the demand for labor will lessen accordingly. Moreover, despite China's remarkable export growth in manufactured goods, total employment in manufacturing has only increased modestly at an annual rate of about 3% in recent years (NBSa, 2008) . Since the manufacturing sector employs predominantly workers with low education, its moderate pace of growing demand, perhaps neutralized by improved productivity coming from continued enterprise privatization and intense global competition, is not putting on additional pressure on labor demand. 2003) . Thus, with unemployment rates hovering at double digits in many Chinese cities after the era of state-sector restructuring (Giles et al., 2005; Knight and Xue, 2006) , mid-aged unemployed workers form another potential supply of unskilled labor, over and above the estimated 58 million young idle rural laborers. It is well known in China that an overwhelming majority of the employers impose an age requirement of 35 and below for job hiring. As wage rises further, these age prejudices are likely to be relaxed, and there will be more active participation responses from those laid-off workers. Thus, the supply of unskilled 22 labor will not be in danger of any severe shortages, implying a strong likelihood for wages in the corresponding sectors to remain competitive.
While wage growth in labor intensive industries is likely moderated by smooth demand and an ample supply of unskilled labor, will the wage of skilled workers continue the steep climb? We believe that the sharp increases in the returns to skill will likely taper off in the near future because of two reasons. First, the rate of return to education, which has been tripled in the past two decades, has already reached the conventional levels observed in other market economies. As a legacy from central planning, low returns to schooling persisted for more than a decade since the inception of reform in late 1970s. However, beginning in the early 1990s, a set of major factors-including capital accumulation, labor market competition, inflow of FDI, export growth, state-sector restructuring, and skill-biased technological change-have increased general demand for skills (e.g., Zhao 2001; Ge and Yang, 2009) . As a result, the estimated returns to education increased persistently, already exceeding 10% by the early 2000s (e.g., Zhang et al., 2005) . In comparison, the average rate of return to another year of schooling is 9.7% for the world and 9.9 % for Asia. 14 As Chinese labor institutions approach completion of their transition to competitive markets, there will be limited scope for further increases in the returns to education.
Another major factor that prevents explosive growth in the wages of skilled labor is the large supply of college graduates over the past several years and those matriculating in the foreseeable future. Due to ever increasing demand for well educated workers and NBSa, 2008) , these newly lost jobs among migrants alone would push up the nationwide unemployment rate by 2.6%. Lost jobs were heavily concentrated in export-oriented manufacturing and construction related businesses (Bottelier, 2009 ).
It appears that layoffs among high skilled urban workers have been rather limited. This is likely the outcome of the government's feverish attempts to control unemployment during this economic downtime, in fear that mass unemployment would lead to social instability. In labor-intensive projects, favorable financing policies for small and medium size enterprises who could effectively absorb employment, provision of special incentives for hiring college graduates, and massive policy programs in forms of tax rebates, tax rate reductions, special loans, and reductions in social security submissions to secure the continued viability of enterprises and thus maintain a healthy demand for jobs. Moreover, a new regulation requires enterprises who plan to lay off 20 or more people or more than 10% of their labor force must inform the upper level labor unions 30 days prior to the action. In effect, this sets in an approval mechanism for all significant layoffs. Local governments have been mobilized to achieve re-employment targets and conduct training programs at deep discount rates for rural migrants and urban unemployed. All of these policies were carried out immediately.
The implementation of these policies has effectively eliminated any large scale layoffs in urban China. Understandably, the protection of employment positions has been at the expense of lowered salaries for existing employees, consistent with a survey report that 26% of workers in Beijing already experienced wage cuts due to the ongoing financial crisis (The Interventionist policies, however, will unavoidably create inefficiencies in the economic system. A remarkable achievement of China through the past decade is that globalization, market competition and state-sector restructuring have dramatically enhanced the labor productivity of all domestic enterprises in both state and non-state sector. Unfortunately, the ongoing interventions of the government to protect employment are reversing the achievements of increasing labor productivity and optimizing labor allocation. When output declines with the unfolding of the economic crisis, the existence of disguised unemployment in both the rural and urban sectors will no doubt lower China's overall labor productivity and international competitiveness. Restoring the efficiency of labor allocation will be a challenging task facing China both for now and in years after the ongoing economic crisis, and that process will play an important role in determining China's future global labor advantage.
31 Guizhou), and Northwest (Qinghai, Ningxia, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, Xinjiang, Gansu, Shaanxi). Tibet is not grouped into any of the regions because it has a very short series of wage data and the sample size is very small. Regional wages are calculated as the weighted average of the provincial wages within that region, with the shares of staff and workers being used as weights. Provincial staff and workers' wages are missing for Inner Mongolia (1979) and Chongqing (1979 Chongqing ( , 1981 . Missing staff and workers numbers include: Inner Mongolia (1979), Hainan (1979) , Chongqing (1979 Chongqing ( , 1981 multiplying the reported wage with 1 plus the value of the bonus ratio. However, UNIDO data has no such availability of two earnings for the same year under two different coverage systems. To try to standardize data after 1993 with the new definition, we constructed estimates of the average bonus percentage of total wage in the following way. We took the average annual growth rate from 1994 to 1996 and interpolated back to the start of data collection in 1985. Then, comparing these estimates of bonus-free wages with the given data, we constructed an average bonus percentage for those years. We finally use this percentage to standardize the bonus-exclusive data.
There are several missing wages in both ILO and UNIDO data; if the missing value is in the middle of two years with available data, a linear interpolation is used to estimate the wage, in order to keep the continuation of the data without affecting the overall trend.
However, if the earnings are missing in the beginning or the ending years, no estimation is made. The country-year missing earnings estimated for ILO include: Philippines 2000 , Taiwan 2003 , Thailand 1987 and 1988 , Malaysia 1998 and 1999 and for UNIDO: Malaysia 1998 , Thailand 1983 , 1985 , 1987 , 1992 , 1995 , 1997 and 1999 . 
